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The classical maximum-entropy principlemethod (Jaynes 1963) ap-
pears in the probability calculus as an approximation of a particular model
by exchangeability or a particular model by sufficiency.
The approximation from the exchangeability model can be inferred
from an analysis by Jaynes (1996) and to some extent from works on
entropic priors (Rodríguez 1989; 2002; Skilling 1989a; 1990). I tried to show
it explicitly in a simple context (Porta Mana 2009). The approximation
from the sufficiency model can be inferred from Bernardo & Smith (2000
§ 4.5) and Diaconis & Freedman (1981) in combination with the Koopman-
Pitman-Darmois theorem (see references in § 3).
In this note I illustrate how either approximations arises, in turn, and
then give a heuristic synopsis of both. At the end I discuss some questions:
Prediction or retrodiction? Which of the two models is preferable? (the
exchangeable one.) How good is the maximum-entropy approximation?
Is this a “derivation” of maximum-entropy?
I assume that you are familiar with: the maximum-(relative-)entropy
method (Jaynes 1957a; much clearer in Jaynes 1963; Sivia 2006; Hobson
et al. 1973), especially the mathematical form of its distributions and its
prescription “expectations = empirical averages”; the probability calculus
(Jaynes 2003; Hailperin 1996; Jeffreys 2003; Lindley 2014); the basics of
models by exchangeability and sufficiency (Bernardo et al. 2000 ch. 4),
although I’ll try to explain the basic ideas behind them – likely you’ve
often worked with them even if you’ve never heard of them under these
names.
1 Context and notation
We have a potentially infinite set of measurements, each having K possible
outcomes. Dice rolls and their six outcomes are a typical example. I use
the terms “measurement” and “outcome” to lend concreteness to the
discussion, but the formulae below apply to much more general contexts.
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PORTA MANA Maximum-entropy from the probability calculus
The proposition that the nth measurement has outcome k is denoted
E
(n)
k . The relative frequencies of the K possible outcomes in a set of
measurements are denoted f : ( fk). It may happen that in a measurement
we observe not directly an outcome but an “observable” having values
(Ok) : O for the K outcomes. This observable may be vector-valued.
The empirical average of the observable in a set of N measurements with
outcomes {k1, . . . , kN} is∑Nn1Okn/N , equivalent to∑k Ok fk .
Probabilities have propositions as arguments (for good definitions of
what a proposition is – it isn’t a sentence, for example – see Strawson 1964;
Copi 1979; Barwise et al. 2003). Johnson’s definition remains one of the
simplest and most beautiful: “Probability is a magnitude to be attached
to any possibly true or possibly false proposition; not, however, to the
proposition in and for itself, but in reference to another proposition the
truth of which is supposed to be known” (Johnson 1924 Appendix, § 2). See
also Hailperin’s (1996; 2011) formalization, sadly neglected in the literature.
The assumptions or knowledge underlying our probabilities – our “model”
– will be generically denoted by I , with subscripts denoting specific
assumptions. We will sometimes let a quantity stand as abbreviation for
a proposition, for example f for “the observed relative frequencies in N
measurements are f ”. In such cases the probability symbol will be in
lower-case to remind us of our notational sins.
Lest this note become an anthill of indices let’s use the following
notation: for positive K-tuples x : (xi), y : (yi), and number a,
ax : (axi), x/y : (xi/yi), xy : (xi yi), xy : (xi yi ),
exp x : (exp xi), ln x : (ln xi), x! : (xi!),∑
x :
∑
k
xk ,
∏
x :
∏
k
xk ,
(
a
ax
)
: a!∏(ax)! .
(1)
The symbol δ indicates a Dirac delta (Lighthill 1964; even better: Egorov
1990; 2001) or a characteristic function (cf. Knuth 1992), depending on the
context.
The Shannon entropy H(x) : −∑ x ln x, and the relative Shannon
entropy or negative discrimination information H(x; y) : −∑ x ln(x/y).
Let’s keep in mind the important properties
H(x; y) ⩽ 0, H(x; y)  0⇔ x  y. (2)
The problem typically addressed by maximum-entropy is this: given
that in a large number N of measurements we have observed an average
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having value in a convex set A (which can consist of a single number),∑
O f ∈ A, (3)
what is the probability of having outcome k in an (N + 1)th measurement?
In symbols,
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, I ]  ? (4)
where I denotes our state of knowledge. The maximum-entropy answer
(Mead et al. 1984; Fang et al. 1997; Boyd et al. 2009) has the form
rk exp(λOk)∑
r exp(λO) (5)
where r is a reference distribution and λ is determined by the constraints
in a way that we don’t need to specify here. The convexity of A ensures
the uniqueness of this answer.
2 Maximum-entropy from a model by exchangeability
Let’s assume that in our state of knowledge Ix we deem the measurements
to be infinitely exchangeable (Bernardo et al. 2000 § 4.2); that is, there can
be a potentially unlimited number of them and their indices are irrelevant
for our inferences. De Finetti’s theorem (1930; 1937; Heath et al. 1976)
states that this assumption forces us to assign probabilities of this form:
P
[
E
(1)
k1
, . . . , E (N)kN
 Ix]  ∫ qk1 · · · qkN p(q | Ix)dq
≡
∫ (∏
qN f
)
p(q | Ix)dq ,
(6)
where the distribution q can be interpreted as the relative frequencies in
the long run,1 and integration is over the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex
(Grünbaum 2003) of such distributions, {q ∈ RK⩾0 |
∑
q  1}. The term
p(q | Ix)dq can be interpreted as the prior probability density of observing
the long-run frequencies q in an infinite number of measurements. This
probability is not determined by the theorem.
Let’s call the expression above an exchangeability model (Bernardo et al.
2000 § 4.3).
1“But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long runwe are all
dead.” (Keynes 2013 § 3.I, p. 65)
3
PORTA MANA Maximum-entropy from the probability calculus
We assume that our state of knowledge Ix is also expressed by a
particular prior density for the long-run frequencies:
p(q | Ix)dq  κ(L, r)
(
L
Lq
) ∏
rLq dq , L ⩾ 1, (7)
which we can call “multinomial prior” because is a sort of continuous
interpolation of the multinomial distribution (Johnson et al. 1996 ch. 35).
in the latter each qk assumes discrete values in {0, 1/L, . . . , 1} and the
normalizing constant is unity; for this reason the normalizing constant
κ(L, r) ≈ L in eq. (7). The results that follow also hold for any other prior
density that is asymptotically equal to the one above for L large, for example
proportional to exp[LH(q; r)], which appears in Rodríguez’s (1989; 2002)
entropic prior and in Skilling’s (1989a; 1990) prior for “classical” and
“quantified” maximum-entropy.
To find the probability (4) queried by maximum-entropy we need the
probability for eachpossible frequencydistribution in theNmeasurements,
which by combinatorial arguments is
p( f | Ix) 
∫ (
N
N f
) (∏
qN f
)
p(q | Ix)dq. (8)
There are
(N+K−1
K−1
)
possible frequency distributions (Csiszár et al. 2004).
By marginalization over the subset of frequencies consistent with our
data, the probability for the empirical average is
P
(∑
O f ∈ A Ix) ∑
f
δ(∑O f ∈ A)∫ ( N
N f
) (∏
qN f
)
p(q | Ix)dq. (9)
Finally using Bayes’s theorem with the probabilities (6)–(9) we find
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Ix]  ∫ qk∑ f δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) (∏ qN f ) p(q | Ix)dq∫ ∑
f δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) (∏ qN f ) p(q | Ix)dq ,
(10)
where the densityp(q | Ix)dq is specified in eq. (7), even though the formula
above holds as well with any other prior density.
I have graphically emphasized this formula because it is the exact answer
given to the question (4) by a general exchangeability model: it holds for
4
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all numbers K of possible outcomes, all numbers N of observations, and
all sets A – even non-convex ones.
If N and L are large we can use the bounds of the multinomial (Csiszár
et al. 1981 Lemma 2.3)(
N
N f
)
 ϵ(N, f ) exp[N H( f )], (N + 1)−K ⩽ ϵ(N, f ) ⩽ 1, (11)
analogously for
( L
Lr
)
.
From the bounds above it can be shown that the exact probability
expression (10) has the asymptotic form
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Ix] ≃
κ(N, L, r)
∫
qk
∑
f
δ(∑O f ∈ A) exp[NH( f ; q) + LH(q; r)]dq ,
N , L large. (12)
I prefer the symbol “≃”, “is asymptotically equal to” (iso 2009; ieee 1993;
iupac 2007), to the limit symbol “→” because the latter may invite to think
about a sequence, but no such sequence exists. In each specific problem N
has one, fixed, possibly unknown value, and cannot be increased at will.
The symbol “≃” says that the right side differs from the left side by an
error that may be negligible. It is our duty to check whether this error is
really negligible for our purposes.
The asymptotic expression above shows an interesting interplay of two
relative entropies. The two exponential terms give rise to two Dirac deltas.
The delta in f requires some mathematical care owing to the discreteness
of this quantity; see Csiszár (1984; 1985). In particular, if N < K the discrete
set of
(N+K−1
K−1
)
possible frequency distributions lies within the (N − 1)-
dimensional facets of the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex of distributions q;
it does not “fill” the simplex. In this case the frequency sum
∑
f cannot be
meaningfully approximated by an integral. The approximations below are
valid if the number N of observations is much larger than the number K
of possible outcomes.
If L/N is also large, taking limits in the proper order gives
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Ix] ≃ rk , N , L, L/N large. (13)
Note how the data about the average (3) are practically discarded in this
(L/N)-large case. Compare with Skilling’s remark that the parameter L
(his α) shouldn’t be “particularly large” (cf. Skilling 1998 p. 2).
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The asymptotic case that interests us is N/L large: the exponential in
N dominates the integral of eq. (12), which becomes
κ(L, r)∑
f
fk δ[∑O f ∈ A] exp[LH( f ; r)] ≃ ∑O f ∈Aarg sup
f
H( f ; r), (14)
so that, finally,
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Ix] ≃ f ∗k , N , L, L/N large,
with f ∗ maximizing H( f ; r) under constraints∑O f ∈ A, (15)
which is the maximum-entropy recipe, giving the distribution (5).
3 Maximum-entropy from a model by sufficiency
Consider the following assumption or working hypothesis, denoted Is: To
predict the outcome of an (N + 1)th measurement given knowledge of the
outcomes of N measurements, all we need to know is the average
∑
O f
of an observable O in those N measurements, no matter the value of N . In
other words, any data about known measurements, besides the empirical
average of O, is irrelevant for our prediction. The average
∑
O f is then
called a minimal sufficient statistics (Bernardo et al. 2000 § 4.5; Lindley 2008
§ 5.5). In symbols,
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 E (1)k1 , . . . , E (N)kN , Is]  p[E (N+1)k  ∑O f ,N, Is] . (16)
Note that the data {E (n)kn } determine the data {
∑
O f ,N} but not vice versa,
so some data have effectively been discarded in the conditional.
The Koopman-Pitman-Darmois theorem (Koopman 1936; Pitman 1936;
Darmois 1935; see also later analyses: Hipp 1974; Andersen 1970; Denny
1967; Fraser 1963; Barankin et al. 1963) states that this assumption forces
us to assign probabilities of this form:
P
[
E
(1)
k1
, . . . , E (N)kN
 Is]  ∫ p(k1 | λ , r , Is) · · ·p(kN | λ , r , Is)p(λ | Is)dλ ,
≡
∫ [∏
p(k | λ , r , Is)N f
]
p(λ | Is)dλ ,
(17a)
with p(k | λ , r , Is) : r exp(λO)Z(λ ) , Z(λ ) :
∑
r exp(λO), (17b)
6
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and we have defined p(k | . . . ) : (p(1| . . . ), . . . , p(K | . . . )) . The integration
of the parameter λ is over RM , withM the dimension of the vector-valued
observable O, and r is a K-dimensional distribution. Neither r or the
distribution p(λ | Is) are determined by the theorem.
Let’s call the expression above a sufficiency model (Bernardo et al. 2000
§ 4.5). A sufficiency model can be viewed as a mixture, with weight
density p(λ | Is)dλ , of distributions having maximum-entropy form (5)
with multipliers λ .
To find the probability (4) we calculate, as in the previous section, the
probabilities for the frequencies:
p( f | Is) 
∫ (
N
N f
) [∏
p(k | λ , r , Is)N f
]
p(λ | Is)dλ , (18)
and for the empirical average by marginalization:
P
(∑
O f ∈ A Is) ∑
f
δ(∑O f ∈ A)∫ ( N
N f
) [∏
p(k | λ , r , Is)N f
]
p(λ | Is)dλ . (19)
From these using Bayes’s theorem we finally find
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Is] ∫
p(k | λ , r , Is)∑ f δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) [∏p(k | λ , r , Is)N f ] p(λ | Is)dλ∫ ∑
f δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) [∏p(k | λ , r , Is)N f ] p(λ | Is)dλ .
(20)
This is the exact answer given to the maximum-entropy question by a
sufficiency model if the constraints used in maximum-entropy are considered to
be a sufficient statistics. This proviso has serious consequences discussed in
§ 5.2. The expression above holds for all N and all sets A, even non-convex
ones.
The asymptotic analysis for large N uses again the multinomial’s
bounds (11). We find
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Is] ≃ κ(N, r)∫ p(k | λ , r , Is) ×∑
f
δ(∑O f ∈ A) exp{NH [ f ; p(k | λ , r , Is)]} p(λ | Is)dλ ,
N large. (21)
7
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Arigorous analysis of this limit can bedoneusing “informationprojections”
(Csiszár 1984; 1985); here is a heuristic summary. Consider the sum in f for
fixed λ . We have two cases. (1) If λ is such that
∑
O p(k | λ , r , Is) ∈ A, there
exists aunique f in the sumforwhich the relative entropy in the exponential
reaches its maximum, zero, making the exponential unity. For all other
f the relative entropy is negative and the exponential asymptotically
vanishes for large N . The integral therefore doesn’t vanish asymptotically.
(2) If λ is such that p(k | λ , r , Is) doesn’t satisfy the constraints, the relative
entropy in the exponential will be negative for all f in the sum, making the
exponential asymptotically vanish for all f . The integral therefore vanishes
asymptotically. The distinction between these two cases actually requires
mathematical care owing to the discreteness of the sum. The f sum then
acts as a delta or characteristic function (depending on whether A has
measure zero or not):∑
f
δ(∑O f ∈ A) exp{NH [ f ; p(k | λ , r , Is)]} ≃ δ[∑O p(k | λ , r , Is) ∈ A] .
(22)
Thus asymptotically we have, using the explicit expression (17b) for
p(k | λ , r , Is):
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Is] ≃∫
δ
[∑
O r
exp(λO)
Z(λ ) ∈ A
]
rk
exp(λOk)
Z(λ ) p(λ | Is)dλ , N large. (23)
This result can also be found first integrating λ and then summing f ,
using a heuristic argument similar to the one above. This is a mixture, with
weight density p(λ | Is)dλ , of maximum-relative-entropy distributions
f ∗ that satisfy the individual constraints
∑
O f ∗  a, a ∈ A . The final
distribution thus differs from the maximum-entropy one if the set A is not
a singleton: maximum-entropy would pick up only one distribution. But
if the constraint set is a singleton, A  {a}, we do obtain the same answer
(5) as the maximum-entropy recipe:
P
[
E
(N+1)
k
 ∑O f  a , Ix] ≃ f ∗k , N large,
with f ∗ maximizing H( f ; r) under constraints∑O f  a. (24)
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4 Heuristic explanation of both asymptotic approximations
First of all let’s note that both the exchangeability (6) and sufficiency (17)
models have the parametric form
P
[
E
(1)
k1
, . . . , E (N)kN
 I ]  ∫ p(k1 | ν , I ) · · ·p(kN | ν , I )p(ν | I )dν
≡
∫ [∏
p(k | ν , I )N f
]
p(ν | I )dν .
(25)
The final probability distribution p for theK outcomes of the (N+1)thmeas-
urement belongs to a (K − 1)-dimensional simplex {p ∈ RK⩾0 |
∑
p  1}.
The expression above first selects, within this simplex, a family of distri-
butions {p(k | ν , I )} parametrized by ν; then it delivers the distribution
p as a mixture of the distributions of this family, with weight density
p(ν | I )dν . In the exchangeability model this family is actually the whole
simplex (that’s why it’s sometimes called a “non-parametric” model). In
the sufficiency model it is an exponential family (Bernardo et al. 2000 § 4.5.3;
Barndorff-Nielsen 2014).
When we conditionalize on data D, the weight density is determined
by the mutual modulation of two weights: that of the probability of the
data p(D | ν , I ) and the initial weight p(ν | I ). Pictorially, if K  3:
p(D | ν , I ) × p(ν | I )  κp(ν |D , I ) (26)
the final p is given by the mixture with the weight density p(ν |D , I )dν
ensuing from this modulation. The mathematical expression of the data
weight p(D | ν , I ) is typically exponentiated to the number of measure-
ments N from which the data originate; compare with eqs (19), (20). If
N is large this weight is very peaked on the subset of distributions that
give highest probability to the data, that is, that have expectations very
close to the empirical averages. It effectively restricts the second weight
p(ν | I )dν to such “data subset”. In our case the data subset consists of all
distributions satisfying the constraints.
The mechanism described so far is common to the exchangeability and
the sufficiency model. Their difference lies in how they choose the final
distribution from the data subset.
9
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In the exchangeability model (6) the choice is made by the weight
density p(ν | I )dν, i.e. the multinomial prior (7). It is extremely peaked
owing to the large parameter L, and its level curves are isentropics. Once it’s
restricted to the data subset by the data weight p(D | ν , I ), it gives highest
weight to the distribution p lying on the highest isentropic curve, which is
unique if the data subset is convex; compare with fig.-eq. (26). Hence this
is a maximum-entropy distribution satisfying the data constraints. For this
mechanism to work it’s necessary that the dominance of the data weight
comes first, and the dominance of the multinomial prior comes second.
This is the reason why the correct asymptotic limit (15) has N , L, and N/L
large.
In the sufficiency model (17) the choice is made by the family of
distributions {p(k | ν , I )}ν . These distributions have by construction a
maximum-entropy form for the particular observable O. This family
intersects the data subset in only one point if the constraint has the form∑
O f  a. This point is therefore the maximum-entropy distribution
satisfying the data constraints.
The mechanism above also explains why these two models still work
if the data subset is non-convex and touches the highest isentropics
(exchangeability model) or the exponential family (sufficiency model) in
multiple points, bringing the maximum-entropy recipe to an impasse. The
final distribution will simply be an equal mixture of such tangency points;
it may well lie outside of the data subset.
5 Discussion
5.1 Prediction or retrodiction? An essential aspect of the maximum-
entropy method is surprisingly often disregarded in the literature. If we
have data from N measurements, we can ask two questions:
“Prediction”: what is the outcome of a further similar measurement?
“Retrodiction”: what is the outcome of the first of the N measurements?
Note that despite the literal meaning of these terms the distinction is not
between future and past, but between unknown and partially known.
It’s rarely made clear whether the maximum-entropy probabilities
refer to the first or to the second question. Yet these two questions are
fundamentally different; their answers rely on very different principles.
To answer the first question we can – but need not – fully rely on
symmetry principles in the discrete case. It is a matter of combinatorics
10
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and equal probabilities; a drawing-from-an-urn problem. Most derivations
of the maximum-entropy method (e.g. Jaynes 1963; Shore et al. 1980;
van Campenhout et al. 1981; Csiszár 1985) address this question only, as
often betrayed by the presence of “p(x1)” or similar expressions in their
final formulae.
To answer the second question, symmetry and combinatorics alone are
no use: additional principles are needed. This is the profoundphilosophical
question of induction, with its ocean of literature; my favourite sample
are the classic Hume (1896 book I, § III.VI), Johnson (1922 esp. chs VIII
ff; 1924 Appendix; 1932), de Finetti (1937; 1959), Jeffreys (1955; 1973 ch. I;
2003 § 1.0), Jaynes (2003 § 9.4). De Finetti, foreshadowed by Johnson, was
probably the one who expressed most strongly, and explained brilliantly,
that the probability calculus does not and cannot explain or justify our
inductive reasoning; it only expresses it in a quantitative way. This shift in
perspective was very much like Galilei’s shift from why to how in the study
of physical phenomena.2 We do inductive inferences in many different
ways (Jaynes 2003 § 9.4). The notion of exchangeability (de Finetti 1937;
Johnson 1924 Appendix; 1932) captures one of the most intuitive and
expresses it mathematically.
The calculations of the previous sections and the final probabilities (10),
(20) for our two models pertain the predictive question, as clear from the
E (N+1) in their arguments. The two models can also be used to answer
the retrodictive question. The resulting formulae are different; they can
again be found applying the rules of the probability calculus and Bayes’s
theorem. The retrodictive formula for the exchangeability model is (proof
2“According to credible traditions it was in the sixteenth century, an age of very
intense spiritual emotions, that people gradually ceased trying, as they had been trying
all through two thousand years of religious and philosophic speculation, to penetrate
into the secrets of Nature, and instead contented themselves, in a way that can only be
called superficial, with investigations of its surface. The great Galileo, who is always the
first to be mentioned in this connection, did away with the problem, for instance, of the
intrinsic reasons why Nature abhors a vacuum, so that it will cause a falling body to
enter into and occupy space after space until it finally comes to rest on solid ground,
and contented himself with a much more general observation: he simply established the
speed at which such a body falls, what course it takes, what time it takes, and what its
rate of acceleration is. The Catholic Church made a grave mistake in threatening this man
with death and forcing him to recant, instead of exterminating him without more ado.”
(Musil 1979 vol. 1, ch. 72)
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in Porta Mana 2009 § B):
P
[
E
(n)
k
 ∑O f ∈ A, Ix]  ∫ ∑ f fk δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) (∏ qN f ) p(q | Ix)∫ ∑
f δ(∑O f ∈ A) ( NN f ) (∏ qN f ) p(q | Ix)dq dq ,
n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. (27)
Graphically it differs from the predictive one (10) only in the replacement
of qk by fk . An analogous replacement appears in the retrodictive formula
for the sufficiency model. But this graphically simple replacement leads
to a mechanism very different from the one of § 4 in delivering the
final probability: it’s a mixture on the data subset rather than on the
whole simplex. Predictive and retrodictive probabilities can therefore be
very different for small N. See for example figs 1 and 2 below and their
accompanying discussion.
This means that the goodness of the maximum-entropy distribution
as an approximation of our two models can depend on whether we are
asking a predictive or a retrodictive question. This fact is very important in
every application.
5.2 Which of the two models is preferable? A maximum-entropy dis-
tribution can be seen as an approximation of the distribution obtained
from the exchangeability model or the sufficiency one (repetita iuvant). The
two inferential models are not equivalent though, and there are reasons
to prefer the exchangeability one – despite the frequent association, in
the literature, of maximum-entropy with exponential families. The most
important and quite serious difference is this:
Suppose that we have used either model to assign a predictive distribu-
tion conditional on the empirical average a of the observable O, obtained
from N measurements. If N is large the distributions obtained from either
model will be approximately equal, and equal to the maximum-entropy
one. Now someone gives us a new empirical average a′ of a different
observable O′, obtained from the same N measurements. This observable
turns out to be complementary to the previous one, in the sense that in
general from knowing the value of
∑
O f we cannot deduce the value of∑
O′ f , and vice versa. These new data therefore reveal more about the
outcomes of our N measurements and of possible further measurements.
The new empirical average a′ can be incorporated in the exchangeability
model; the resulting predictive and retrodictive distributions conditional
on (a′, a) will be numerically different from the ones conditional on a only.
12
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They will be approximated by a maximum-entropy one based on the old
and new constraints.
If we incorporate the new average in the sufficiency model, however,
the resulting predictive conditional distribution will be unchanged: knowledge
of the new data has no effect in the prediction of new measurements. The
reason is simple: the sufficiency model expresses by construction that
the average of the old observable O is all we need for our inferences
about further measurements. Any other observable is irrelevant. The new
average automatically drops out under predictive conditioning. The only
way to obtain a different predictive conditional distribution would be to
discard the sufficiency model based on O, and use a new one based on
(O ,O′). But that would be cheating!
This shows how dramatically absolute and categorical the assumption
of the existence of a sufficient statistics is. The difficulty above doesn’t
happen for the retrodictive distribution; the proof is left as an exercise for
you.
Since the maximum-entropy method is meant to always employ new
constraints, we deduce that it’s more correct to interpret it as an approxim-
ation of the exchangeability model than of the sufficiency model.
5.3 How good is the maximum-entropy approximation? How does
maximum-entropy compare with the exchangeability model (6) with
multinomial prior (7) away from the asymptotic approximation?
Their distributions are compared in the classic example of dice rolling
in figs 1 and 2 for empirical averages of 5 and 6 (see Porta Mana 2009
for the calculations). The maximum-entropy distribution (red) is at the
top; the distribution of the exchangeability model with L  1 (blue) and
L  50 (bluish purple) is shown underneath for the cases N  2, N  12,
N  ∞, and for the retrodiction of an “old roll” E (n)k , n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, and
the prediction of a “new roll” E (N+1)k . The charts also report the Shannon
entropies H of the distributions.
The exchangeability model gives very reasonable and even “logical”
probabilities for small N . For example, if you obtain an average of 5 in two
rolls, it’s impossible that either of them was  – unless, of course, you
own a six-sided die with nine pips on one face. The exchangeability model
logically gives zero probability in this case (fig. 1 bottom left). Maximum-
entropy gives an erroneous non-zero probability. And having obtained
an average of 5 or 6 in two rolls, would you really give a much higher
probability to 	 or 
 for a third roll? I’d still give 1/6. The exchangeability
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Figure 1 Maximum-entropy and exchangeability model, empirical average a  5
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Figure 2 Maximum-entropy and exchangeability model, empirical average a  6
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model reasonably gives an almost uniform distribution, especially for
large L (both figures bottom right). The maximum-entropy distribution is
unreasonably biased towards high values. If we observe a high average
in twelve rolls we start to suspect that the die/dice or the roll technique
are biased. The exchangeability model expresses this bias, but more
conservatively than maximum-entropy.
In fact the predictive exchangeability-model distribution can have
higher entropy than the maximum-entropy one! This happens because,
when N is small compared to L, the maximum-entropy prescription “what
you’ve seen in N measurements  what you should expect in an (N +1)th
measurement” is silly (MacKay 2003 Exercise 22.13). The exchangeability
model intelligently doesn’t respect this prescription strictly, ifN isn’t large.3
See Porta Mana (2009) for comparisons under other values of the empirical
average and of the number of measurements.
When is N large enough for the prescription to become reasonable?
In other words, when is maximum-entropy a good approximation of
the exchangeability model with multinomial prior? The answer depends
on the interplay among the number of measurements N, the number
of possible outcomes K, the parameter L, the reference distribution r ,
and the value a (or range A) of the observed average. The first three
ingredients determine the maximum heights of the densities involved in
the integral and sum of eq. (10); the last three ingredients determine the
size of the effective integration and sum region relative to the integration
simplex, and the distance between the peaks of the data weights and the
prior weights of fig.-eq. (26). All five ingredients determine how good
are the delta approximations in the integral and sum of eq. (10). We saw
in § 2, p. 5, after eq. (12), that N needs to be much larger than K for the
integral and delta approximations of the frequency sum to be meaningful.
Maximum-entropy approximations are not meaningful if the number of
possible outcomes is much larger than the number of observations.
It would be very useful to have explicit estimates of the maximum-
entropy-approximation error as a function of the four quantities above. I
hope to analyse them in a future note, and promise it would be a shorter
note.
5.4 Is this a “derivation” of maximum-entropy? The heuristic explana-
tion of § 4 shows that the maximum-entropy distributions appear asymp-
totically owing to our specific choices of a multinomial prior in the
3“Obedience is no longer a virtue.” (Milani 1965)
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exchangeability model, and of an exponential family with observable
O in the sufficiency model. They are therefore not derived only from
first principles or from some sort of universal limit. This is why I don’t
call the asymptotic analysis discussed in this note a “derivation” of the
maximum-entropy “principle”. In my opinion this analysis shows that it
is not a principle at all.
The information-theoretic arguments – or should we say incentives –
behind the standard maximum-entropy recipe can be lifted to ameta4 level
and used for priors asymptotically equivalent to the multinomial prior (7),
as done by Rodríguez (1989; 2002) for the entropic prior (see also Skilling
1989a; 1990). Such arguments don’t determine the parameters L and r ,
though. They seem to be prone to an infinite regress; Jaynes was aware of
this (Jaynes 2003 § 11.1, p. 344).
It would be useful if the multinomial or entropic priors could be
uniquely determined by intuitive inferential assumptions, as for example
is the case with the Johnson-Dirichlet prior, proportional to qL dq: this
prior must be used if we believe (denote this by IJ) that the frequencies of
other outcomes are irrelevant for predicting a particular one:
p
[
E
(N+1)
k
 f ,N, IJ]  p[E (N+1)k  fk ,N, IJ] , k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, (28)
a condition called “sufficientness” (Johnson 1924; 1932; Good 1965 ch. 4;
Zabell 1982; Jaynes 1996). Asymptotically it leads to a maximum-entropy
distributionwith Burg’s (1975) entropy
∑
ln x (see Jaynes 1996; PortaMana
2009).
But, after all, the logical calculus doesn’t tell uswhich truths to choose at
the beginning of a logical deduction. Why should the probability calculus
tell us which probabilities to choose at the beginning of a probabilistic
induction?
5.5 Conclusion Interpreting the maximum-entropy method as an ap-
proximation of the exchangeable model (6) with multinomial prior (7) has
many advantages:
• it clears up the meaning of the “expectation  average” prescription of
the maximum-entropy method;
• it identifies the range of validity of such prescription;
• it quantifies the error of the maximum-entropy approximation;
4“This is an expression used to hide the absence of any mathematical idea [. . .].
Personally, I never use this expression in front of children.” (Girard 2001 p. 446)
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• it gives a more sensible solution when this approximation doesn’t hold;
• it clearly differentiates between prediction and retrodiction;
• it can be backed up by information-theoretic incentives (Rodríguez
1989; 2002) if you’re into those.
Disadvantages:
• It can’t be used to answer the question “Where did the cat go?”. But
this question lies forever beyond the reach of the probability calculus.
That’s all (Hanshaw 1928).
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the developers and maintainers of LATEX, Emacs, AUCTEX, Open Science
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